The battle to merge a fractured territory of land which was fought for over 30 years was brought to a final close on the 18th of May 2009. The dramatic and resounding victory for Sri Lanka is going to be the topic for discussion and will be studied for many years to come. Whilst the deep and complex divide of the ethnic conflict that held us in its firm grip is another whole can of worms, the momentous victory of the war offers some lessons which can be successfully applied to our routine professional lives. Correlate this bitter ethnic war with a different kind of war we fight everyday- the marketing war.
It all began in the early 70’s when a little known brand, an outfit called the Tigers began a mission to carve out a separate state. They were to in a short space of time, fashion themselves as the most efficient, albeit ruthless terror outfit in the world. So effective were their tactics that they beat the world’s fourth largest conventional army back to India. At the time the Tigers would not have possessed a fraction of the technology of the IPKF but they were consistent with their mission and were determined to see victory. As years rolled on they expanded their force by winning battles and spreading their hold on land, running a parallel unofficial administration that brought them revenues and global recognition. Their brand was “Terrorism”
Sri Lanka was defending the onslaught of the Tigers under the brand of “Democracy” adopting various strategies, politically and militarily only to see the Tigers expand their brand to gain market share in world opinion. This steadily increased Tiger funding and saw them acquiring more and more territory geographically. Psychologically they wielded a greater demarcation that virtually touched the boarders of the south affecting tourism and foreign investment which stunted the growth of the country for many years. Apart from the military arsenal they possessed they effectively used the world media to garner a growing wave of sympathy from the west.
What then, caused the sudden and rapid disintegration of this once invincible brand? In retrospect when you analyse the dramatic collapse of the Tigers you will realise that the weak points in the brand’s lifecycle were left unattended, and laid bare to a series of events that were taking place in the global market, exposing the vulnerability of the brand. The Tigers can only blame themselves, for the short sightedness and complacency of their brand managers who trusted too much, and basked too long in their brand superiority. They failed to realise that their run of success was coming to an end as a result of a series of global events compounded with stunning attacks to the heart of the military and political establishments. Their brand “terrorism” had three compelling warning signals that went unheeded just before the final death blow was delivered. 1. The loss of consumer loyalty 2. The faltering distribution channel and 3. The erosion of brand value.
The first alarm rang immediately after 9/11 when consumers in the West woke-up to the bitter truth that the brand they had hitherto called “liberation struggle” was merely that which is otherwise called, “terrorism” marketed under a different and more appealing brand name. Having been at the receiving end of Terrorism, the western world was fast in denouncing the brand they had once been partial towards. . Although the brand continued to command loyalty from the Diaspora, global sentiments from opinion leading politicians and the media began to wane. This resulted in the Tigers steadily losing market share in world opinion.
The second alarm rang when Sri Lanka seized the moment, post 9/11 and swung into action to strangle the Tiger distribution channels to raise funds. This limited the buy-in of the brand as Western nations began banning the Tigers. This was Prabakaran’s second big but unheeded warning that Terrorism was going out of vogue and was not going to be easily accepted even under the banner of a liberation struggle. Interest in the brand limited its influence to a relatively small but monetarily powerful Diaspora.
Thirdly a significant part of the Tiger brand value that was carefully nurtured and built over two-and-a-half decades fell apart with the Eastern Command of the LTTE breaking away in 2004. The Eastern command joining the government akin to a marketing manager joining a competing brand armed with a treasury of intelligence on the brand. This was the third and final warning to Prabakaran that his brand was under serious threat. This too, went unheeded.
The arrival of the Rajapakse regime in 2005 began setting a new agenda in motion to win the war when the Tiger outfit was still living in a world of complacency. The manner in which the President went about drawing his plan, in business terms was like an astute CEO drawing a business frame work to re- launch the brand Democracy by using a combination of PR and innovative military strategy. There will be inevitable questions of what was ethical or not in the strategy but that is certainly not the scope or objective of this article, neither am I competent to answer them. However, from a marketing perspective, one thing can be clearly assessed, that is the “Single mindedness” of the County’s CEO. Like in the brand world where brands are buffeted and challenged by things within and outside the control of brand managers the President was challenged by world leaders, opposition from political parties, the media, funding agencies, threats of sanctions, calls for war crime charges, rising expenditure, and what have you in response to his aggressive battle plans. All of this was also turning –up unfavourable economic indicators and adding to the woes of the brand Democracy. But the strength of his single minded ambition, impeccable consistency and unwavering conviction, eventually prevailed and the brand of Democracy was restored.
The debacle of the Tigers was clearly a combination of advanced military strategy and renewed courage of the Sri Lankan forces. Renewed, by a single minded vision set in motion by the Commander-in-chief himself. In a marketing sense Prabakaran succumbed to his own strategy based on “insights” when he actually should have been focussed on “outsights”. The topic of “outsights” however, is a whole new discussion. My article on this topic has been addressed at length in an article I wrote for Business Today in August 2008. Alternatively visit the JWT blog by following this link http://blog.jwt.lk/?p=81 to get more information on the frailty of insights in the new brand world. At the very least the Tiger brand should have realised that a portfolio of terror, wrapped in a product called terrorism and packaged as a liberation struggle was losing appeal steadily in the west and the brand had no purpose with consumers who once believed in it. The Tiger supremo ignored changes in the geopolitical environment and to evolve with the times and he became outdated in his communication to the world. As a colleague put it “his strategy was like operating a gramophone in the era of the ipod”. Prabakaran did not understand that the world went through a massive “opinion overhaul” at 8.46am on the 11th Of September 2001. He missed two other subsequent alarms which eventually led to his and the demise of thousands of his cadre.
The lesson we can learn is to be single minded with a brand’s vision and not waver under pressure. Many brands that operate in Sri Lanka disseminate multiple messages and stand for many things thereby lacking uniqueness and relevance to the consumer. Consumers at most are capable of processing a single message at a time. In the case of restoring the brand Democracy the simplicity of a “single minded” focus was understood by the brand’s stakeholders the armed forces and public. Their commitment and opinion mattered and the CEO of Sri Lanka won overwhelming approval to win a 30 year battle which the country almost lost. Regaining Sri Lanka will perhaps be one of the sensational comeback stories that will be related for years to come. The lesson for the marketer is to be consistent in adopting a single minded proposition for their brand. It must be one with simplicity and relevance that will make the brand steadfast in the face of economic adversity or even in boom times.
To achieve this, firstly break free from the shackles that prevent us from evolving. The brand’s evolutionary process is inclusive of changes in consumer behaviour and the category it operates in. Something the Tiger brand ignored post 9/11. In circumstances such as an economic slow down a brand has little choice but to find its true relevance with the consumer and the category as a matter of priority. The analogy here is the Rajapakse regime rode on the call for the “Global war on terror”. The timing of the thrust was perfect. There was little resistance and more approval from the West until the latter months of the war. Secondly enjoy past success but remember to leave it in the past for complacency is all around where success is. Past success does not necessarily mean it’s the strategy for the future. The analogy here is that the brand of Democracy actually had little success it could harp on from this 30 year war until it recommenced in 2007. This was quickly recognised and a new strategy was mapped out on a clean slate. The failure of the marketer in most instances is that they are trapped with old success modules to conquer a new world of changes that impact brands. This is where intellectual innovation is most required. Thirdly and most importantly is to be single minded and consistent with the vision once it’s determined. There is no greater power than to have an unwavering vision for a brand through its journey towards its objective. The analogy here is that the army and public rallied around the vision to liberate the country and believed in the vision set by the Rajapakse regime, despite set backs the government had to deal with in world opinion.
In summary, your own army-the sales force and your own public-the consumer will get behind your brand and will respect you if you hold the course firmly. Wilting under pressure to change your vision now and then in a recession or even in boom times to suit varying market challenges send wrong and confusing signals to your internal and external customers. The army that restored the brand of Democracy used a combination of sophisticated air, sea and land weaponry to achieve the end. But I believe that it was a single weapon far less sophisticated than the ones that were used that eventually won the war. A weapon, which hit the once invincible Tiger brand to oblivion. It was the weapon of “single mindedness” that drew the war to a conclusion on the morning of the 18th May 2009.

Hi Thayalan,
Well wriiten & while agreeing to most of it I would like to add few on same line of thoughts.
Also Tigers lost their core brand essence – “guerrilla war” and aspired to be a conventional army by purchasing heavy weaponry, aircrafts and ships they even try to build submarines.
This brought in inefficiency and corruption which could be afforded only by a conventional army, thus eroding their core brand essence.
Through out the world guerrilla warfare’s fought mostly using indigenous weaponry & methodologies, which Tigers used one such method at the beginning – suicide bombers, however with passing of time novelty & effectiveness of this was worn out.
Another key important factor Tigers was loosing out was their core consumer group – ‘general public’ in and around Jaffna who have gone through so much due to the 30 year long war, instead of looking in to their needs Tigers was flattered by their superior brand power and started living a luxurious life – air-conditioned bunkers & vehicles, swimming pools which was definitely appealing to Tamil diasporas abroad but not for general public in Jaffna patiently and desperately waiting to see the end of war and living in their dream land of Eelam!
Rohith,
I agree with your views particularly paragraph 2, 3 & 4. Very relevant.
Barty
A clever comparison. This is a classic case of “the competition taking over.” Agree on most part.
However, I think the winning brand (SLGov in this case) had a better strategy; not a better proposition. The Government proposition did not change much in the last 30 years, only the strategy changed. The government agenda has multiple messages; not just one. But this time there were better “reasons to believe” – this time the consumers could believe in the brand, and they did.
Sri Lankans – unlike the West where the most marketing theories come from – live complex lives, and are able to digest complex communication. Two or three messages in one 30” radio or TVC is commonplace, because the consumers are able to decipher those. We don’t live lives that are linear like the Americans – we don’t have the habit of calling before arriving at someone’s doorstep for dinner. We drive to work amongst Hummers and bullock carts on either side of the same road, how many times a month do we have to take off from work to attend unplanned events? The Lankan consumer thrives in complexity in everyday life. Advertising communication is no exception.
A good strategy will give any brand a great proposition; and I believe the war was won because we had a good strategy. Communication was part of that, but it was never single minded. We had to give different messages to different target groups because the objectives were very different from each other: the Military for morale, the people for support, the funding agents for development… we were selling the same toffee in different wrapping, really.
At the end of the day, a good proposition will not hold without good marketing strategy.
What I meant to say was that as long as there is a good strategy in place, brand-building works; the proposition doesn’t necessarily have to be single minded. Especially in Sri Lanka, where the consumers are used to complexities in life.